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Summary
In the late 1990s the NLR and Fokker ELMO were involved in the development of a safety
critical embedded system, the Flight Control Display Module (FCDM). The FCDM is part of
the Flight Control and Display System (FCDS). The FCDS is developed by Sextant Avionique
as part of their Avionique Nouvelle concept. The FCDS finds its first application in the
EuroCopter EC-135 helicopter. Within FCDS, FCDM acts as a data concentrator and transmits
flight control and navigation data to display units.
This paper describes the development and verification of the FCDM. The inputs for the
development process are described: system requirements and a pre-defined hardware
architecture. The development process resulted in a software architecture that is also briefly
described. Partitioning has been applied to segregate less critical components, which resulted
into three different levels for the software: A, B and E.
A brief description of all DO-178B software life cycle processes is given.
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1 Introduction
The last thirty years show an exponential growth in the use of software within airborne systems
[Storey]. These systems are typical examples of embedded systems. They are used to monitor
the state of or even to control an aircraft and to display flight control and navigation data to the
pilots. The nature of these systems is safety critical if the impact of a failure leads to conditions
which prevents an aircraft from a continued safe flight and/or landing.
In the late 1990s the NLR and Fokker ELMO were involved in the development of a safety
critical embedded system, the Flight Control Display Module (FCDM). The FCDM is part of
the Flight Control and Display System (FCDS). The FCDS is developed by Sextant Avionique
as part of their Avionique Nouvelle concept. The FCDS finds its first application in the
EuroCopter EC-135 helicopter. Within FCDS, FCDM acts as a data concentrator and transmits
flight control and navigation data to display units.
The guidelines for the production of software for civil airborne systems and equipment are
documented in [DO-178B]. An independent third party (the certification authority) checks on
compliance with these guidelines by performing a number of audits. According to DO-178B the
system safety assessment process results into a classification of all software components into
five possible software levels. Since the FCDM handles flight critical control and navigation data
the FCDM software is classified as level A (the most severe level).
This paper describes the development and verification of the FCDM. The inputs for the
development process are described: system requirements and a pre-defined hardware
architecture. The development process resulted in a software architecture that is also briefly
described. Partitioning has been applied to segregate less critical components, which resulted
into three different levels for the software: A, B and E.
A brief description of all DO-178B software life cycle processes is given.
2 FCDM system requirements
Apart from FCDM, FCDS is made up of display units, Instrument Control Panels (ICP) and a
Reconfiguration Control Unit (RCU).
Flight control data is displayed on the Primary Flight Display unit (PFD) and navigation data is
displayed on the Navigation Display unit (ND). The ICP enables the pilot(s) to change flight
settings and to select flight equipment and display modes.
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Two operation modes are defined for the FCDM:
• Single or Double Pilot Visual Flight Rules (SPVFR, DPVFR) with one FCDM.
• Single or Double Pilot Instrument Flight Rules (SPIFR, DPIFR) with two FCDMs. In this
case a cross-link for data validation between the two FCDMs is used to achieve the IFR
safety requirements. The FCDM module itself, however, has no redundancy.
In IFR safety critical flight equipment is duplicated and manual reconfigurable by the pilots by
using the Reconfiguration Control Unit (RCU). This reconfiguration is typically performed in
case of discrepancy of pre-defined parameters between the equipment.
The following figure shows the FCDMs in a DPIFR configuration with two sets of display units
(PFD/ND), two ICPs and the RCU. As an example of connected input equipment the Attitude
Heading Reference System (AHRS) is shown.
AHRS
FCDM FCDM
RCU
ICP
PFD/
ND
PFD/
ND
ICP
AHRS
Fig. 1  FCDM in Dual Pilot Instrument Flight Rules (DPIFR) configuration
All indicated busses are ARINC 429 busses with the exception of the discrete busses from RCU
to the FCDMs. ARINC 429 is a standard communication bus in civil avionics; discrete busses
transmit only logical 1/0 states.
The FCDM implements the following functionality:
• Aircraft configuration management by means of a downloadable FCDS configuration file.
• Parameter selection received from the helicopter equipment (ARINC 429 sensors).
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• Safety validation by checking refresh rates of all equipment and calculating discrepancies
for duplicated equipment.
• Transmission of processed data to PFD and ND and to other helicopter equipment.
• Management of two ICPs.
• Management of manual equipment reconfigurations.
• Management of cyclic in-flight checks.
• Management of function tests and storage of test results.
• Failure management.
3 Hardware architecture
The FCDM module consists of two Central Processor Units (CPUs). One CPU is dedicated for
all ARINC 429 input and output handling (I/O processor), the other CPU is dedicated to discrete
I/O handling, data processing, data validation, flight control, etc. (Main processor), see figure 2.
The IO hardware components are:
• Three ARINC 429 controller chips. Each controller contains 8 input channels with control
logic to check the consistency (parity and length) of received ARINC words and 3 output
channels.
• Intel i386EX CPU @ 66 MHz. with an embedded timer, used as Real Time Clock (RTC).
• Memory: 256 Kbytes static RAM (for run-time data, e.g. set-up data, stack, etc.) and 256
Kbytes PROM (for IO firmware).
The Main hardware components are:
• Intel i386EX CPU @ 66 MHz. with embedded:
 Watch Dog Timer (WDT).
 Timer used as Cycle Timer.
• Memory: 256 Kbytes static RAM (for run-time data, e.g. set-up data, stack, etc.), 512
Kbytes PROM (for the boot firmware and the application software) and 16 Kbytes Non
Volatile RAM (NVRAM, for non-volatile data, e.g. error log data, ICP data, FCDS
configuration file, etc.).
• One serial I/O controller with an EIA 485 serial port for maintenance purposes and an EIA
232 serial port for a debug and status monitor.
• Discrete I/O interfaces with 48 inputs and 32 outputs.
The I/O and Main CPUs are linked through shared memory (16 Kbytes dual ported RAM) to
exchange set-up information, I/O control and ARINC 429 flight data.
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RAM Main CPUI/O CPU
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Fig. 2- FCDM dual CPU hardware architecture
4 Software architecture
Analysis of the system requirements and the already available hardware resulted in the decision
to develop three software components:
• A boot strap loader.
• Firmware for the I/O processor.
• Software for the Main processor.
Figure 3 depicts this software architecture. It shows the downloadable FCDM/Main software
(by the boot strap loader), the downloadable FCDS configuration file and the ARINC 429 and
discrete inputs/outputs.
ARINC
429
IO
IO Main
Discrete
IO
Boot
Downloadable
Main Sw
Downloadable
FCDS Config. 
File
IO buffer
(sh.mem.)
Main Sw
(PROM)
IO Sw
(PROM)
Fig. 3  FCDM software architecture
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4.1 Boot strap loader
The boot strap loader is used to download data and/or application software (i.e. a hardware
production test/acceptance procedure or the Main application software) and to start application
software.
The hardware production test/acceptance procedure is used to perform a comprehensive
functional test of the FCDM hardware. It is loaded into the FCDM on ground on a dedicated
workbench. This item is outside the scope of this paper.
4.1.1 Safety consideration
The decision whether to start the load function or to start the application program may have a
catastrophic impact on the helicopter safety and is therefore classified to be DO-178B level A.
The down load function itself, however, is level E.
The boot strap loader is defined to be firmware since its functionality will not change in time; it
is located in the FCDM/Main PROM.
4.2 FCDM/IO firmware
The FCDM/IO firmware receives, selects and validates all ARINC 429 data and transmits
ARINC 429 data to a/o the display units through the normal and safety busses.
In the FCDM/IO set-up mode set-up data is exchanged from FCDM/Main to FCDM/IO through
the shared memory. This data is used to initialise the ARINC 429 controllers and the I/O
processing. The load of set-up data is completed with a verification of the checksum of all set-
up data.
In the operational mode FCDM/IO receives, selects and validates (in terms of data coherency:
number of bits and parity) ARINC 429 data. The ARINC 429 controllers perform this task. All
data is time-stamped and stored on its specific location in the shared memory, either in a FIFO
(for data of which not a single sample may be missed) or in a most recent sample buffer (for
data of which always the most recent sample has to be available).
In operational mode FCDM/IO transmits ARINC 429 data as well. ARINC 429 output data is
stored in FIFOs in shared memory. There is one FIFO for every ARINC 429 output channel.
The set-up mechanism allows a flexible configuration of all ARINC 429 inputs and outputs.
Since the basic IO functionality will not change in time, the FCDM/IO is defined to be
firmware.
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4.2.1 Safety consideration
Since the FCDM handles safety critical control and navigation data all the FCDM/IO firmware
is considered to be level A.
To guarantee the integrity of the FCDM/IO hardware and firmware FCDM/IO performs an
exhaustive Power-on Built-in Test (a/o checksum verification on the firmware and memory
tests). This test is performed only in case of a cold start.
The implementation of a Cyclic Built In Test (CBIT, a/o memory tests) increases the integrity
of FCDM/IO even further.
4.3 FCDM/Main software
The FCDM/Main software implements the major part of the system requirements.
The FCDM/Main software uses tables for all input/output processing, reconfigurations,
calculations and monitoring activities. At start-up these tables are optimised (adding redundant
data from other tables) and actualised with data from the FCDS configuration file to speedup the
real-time processing as much as possible.
A new FCDS configuration file can be downloaded in maintenance mode through the EIA 485
serial link.
In operational mode FCDM/Main processes all ARINC 429 data. All ARINC 429 data is
validated in terms of refresh rate. To meet the system integrity safety critical parameters are
checked for value discrepancies. The integrity of the FCDMs is increased by reading safety
critical data from the cross-link and to check them for value discrepancies.
The ICPs only send incremental data to the FCDMs. FCDM /Main maintains for both ICPs all
modes and states of the flight settings. These settings are stored in the NVRAM, hence after an
in-flight re-start FCDM continues with the most recent values for the settings.
Reconfiguration is determined by reading the RCU input discretes and the RCU information
from the opposite FCDM through the cross-link. Comparing these sets of information makes the
final decision. In case of reconfiguration of equipment, the equipment is not taken into account
for any processing but the remaining equipment takes over.
4.3.1 Safety considerations
To guarantee the integrity of the FCDM/Main hardware, software and FCDS system
consistency FCDM/Main performs a Power-On Self-Test (POST). This POST is executed at
start-up in case of a cold start or fatal error.
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The implementation of a Cyclic Built In Test (CBIT, a/o checksum verification of all set-up
tables, memory tests) increases the integrity of FCDM/Main further.
All operational functions processing flight critical data are considered to be level A. CBIT and
POST functions are level B, while maintenance functions are considered to be level E.
4.3.2 Partitioning
To ensure that more critical software components are not affected by less critical components
the components have to be segregated from each other. One architectural concept, as proposed
by DO-178B to comply with this, is software partitioning.
The FCDM/Main software uses the partitioning to:
• Provide isolation between functionally independent software components.
• Isolate faults.
Isolation between software components is achieved by using:
• Spatial partitioning.
• Temporal partitioning.
FCDM/Main implements the spatial partitioning by using the i386EX paging mechanism.
Temporal partitioning is used to execute the CBIT as a separate task in background.
5 Software development process
5.1 Requirements process
For the requirements analysis Structured Analysis with Real Time extensions (SA/RT) [Hatley
& Phirbhai] supported by the Cadre TeamWork CASE tool was used. The SA/RT process and
control specifications contain the high level requirements in plain English.
All system requirements are identified with a unique number. This number is reflected within
the requirements analysis (and the SA/RT model) to accommodate requirements traceability
from system requirement to high level requirement.
5.2 Design process
Software design is the process through which high level requirements are translated into low-
level requirements and the software architecture. The software architecture basically consists of
a structure of interrelated modules. The modules contain coherent sets of functions and
definitions of data structures.
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For the design the Structured Design method (SD) [Yourdon] was planned to be used. Since the
system requirements evolved during the implementation of the project the SD model became
unmanageable. It was decided then to stay with the preliminary design and to insert structured
pseudo code into the source files. The pseudo code was extracted from the source files at the
end of the project and forms the main constituent of the design document.
A simple call tree presents the software architecture in the design document.
High level requirements are allocated to specific functions within modules. Function names are
used as identifier for the low-level requirement identification. This accommodates the
requirement traceability from high level requirements to low-level requirements.
5.3 Coding process
The objective of the coding process is to produce source code based upon the software
architecture and the low-level requirements.
For this process the customer required the use of the C programming language. Due to the
criticality of the application an ANSI C compiler is used and the NLR proprietary C coding
standard was enhanced according to the guidelines of [Hatton]. Using a Commercial Of The
Shelf (COTS) static analysis tool enforced the (restricted) use of the C programming language
features.
Since the source code was enhanced with detailed design directives (file headers, function
headers and pseudo code) traceability between low-level requirements and source code was
easily satisfied.
5.4 Integration process
The objective of this process is to produce the application executables by using the target
computer, the source code from the coding process and the software architecture from the
design process.
In a first level of the implementation the core of the FCDM software (the table driven
input/output processing, reconfigurations and calculation activities) was developed and tested in
the UNIX host environment. After the target system became available the FCDM software was
adapted and tuned for the target environment.
To test and debug the application in its target environment a COTS in-circuit emulator in
conjunction with a cross-debugger and a COTS ARINC-429 simulation tool was used.
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The ARINC simulation tool simulates the helicopter environment by producing a number of
relevant ARINC 429 data busses (i.e. simulated helicopter equipment) and displays in real-time
a number of selected ARINC 429 busses from the FCDM.
The emulator enables the developer with step by step operations, memory and register checking,
breakpoint setting, timing analysis, etc.
The target computer used for the integration process was a so-called development board. To be
able to clip-on the emulator this board was not provided with the protective coating, as the
production boards are. Moreover, the watch dog capability was disabled to allow debugging
with the emulator. Apart from that the development board and the production boards are
functionally identical.
UNIX
PC
PC
EmulatorEmulator
Target
Test panelTest panel
Discrete IO ARINC 429
Debug,
Download
VT100
Debug/Spy
Et
he
rn
e
t
UNIX UNIX
Fig. 4  FCDM development/integration environment
Figure 4 shows the development/integration environment for the FCDM.
The test panel is used to simulate all discrete inputs/outputs. The UNIX systems are used for the
development and configuration management. The PCs are used for testing and debugging the
application with the in-circuit emulator in conjunction with the cross-debugger and the ARINC
simulation tool. The VT100 terminal is used for in-line debug and spy purposes.
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6 Software verification process
6.1 Verification
Verification is defined in [Ref. DO-178B] as ‘the evaluation of the results of a process to ensure
correctness and consistency with respect to the inputs and standards to that process’. So,
verification is not simply testing, but typically a combination of reviews, analyses and test. The
general objectives of the software verification process are to verify that:
• The system requirements have been developed into software high-level requirements that
satisfy those system requirements (verification of requirement process).
• The high-level requirements have been developed into software architecture and low-level
requirements that satisfy the high-level requirements (verification of design process).
• The software architecture and low-level requirements have been developed into source code
that satisfies the low-level requirements and software architecture (verification of coding
and integration process).
• The executable object code satisfies the low-level software requirements (testing).
• The means used to satisfy the verification process objectives are technically correct and
complete for the software level (verification of the verification process itself).
For level A software, [DO-178B] requires that the above objectives are satisfied with
independence, which in practice means that other persons than the developers perform the
verification activities.
For lower software levels less emphasis is on requirements coverage and structural code
coverage and their verification.
With testing as the only exception, all the above verification objectives have been achieved by
analysing and reviewing the outputs of the process. Note that the verification process itself is
subject to verification.
6.2 Testing
Testing is defined in [Ref. DO-178B] as `the process of exercising a system or system
component to verify that it satisfies specified requirements and to detect errors’.  Three types (or
levels) of testing can be distinguished:
• Validation or hardware/software integration testing.
• Integration testing.
• Unit or low-level testing.
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6.2.1 Validation or hardware/software integration testing
Validation or hardware/software integration testing is used to verify that the object code is
compliant with and robust to the high-level requirements. Validation testing is performed by
using the ARINC-429 simulation tool. With this kind of test environment test automation is not
possible, which is a major concern when regression testing has to take place. All validation tests
are performed on an FCDM production board.
6.2.2 Integration testing
Integration testing is used to verify the interrelationships between software requirements and
components and to verify the implementation of the software requirements and software
components within the software architecture. Integration testing is performed by making
emulator scripts and executing them on an FCDM (development) board. The output of these
scripts is then compared with expected output results. This approach makes it possible to
automatically re-run the tests whenever necessary.
6.2.3 Unit or low-level testing
Unit testing is used to verify that the software units are compliant with and robust to the low-
level requirements. This testing is performed by using a COTS test tool that can also provide
detailed structural code coverage information of the tests that have been performed. For this
purpose the tool instruments the source code, this then has to be re-compiled and run again. For
level A software this approach is only allowed when it is guaranteed that the compiler produces
object code that is directly traceable to the source code. All unit tests have been performed on an
FCDM (development) board using an emulator.
The successful implementation of the partitioning mechanism implied that no unit testing was
applied to level E software units.
7 Other life cycle processes
Note: A detailed description of the other DO-178B life cycle processes is outside the scope of
this article.
7.1 Software planning process
The DO-178B document is not a development standard. Basically it consists of lists of
objectives to fulfil in each software life cycle process. The main objective of the planning
process is to define how compliance to the objectives is achieved. For this the actual software
development standard was defined and methods and tools were chosen.
-16-
NLR-TP-99241
For example consider the verification process: DO-178B requires the generation of verification
results but does not prescribe where or how to document the results.
For FCDM the [DoD-2167A] standard was used as a guideline for the documentation.
7.2 Software quality assurance process
The software quality process assesses the software life cycle processes and their outputs to
obtain assurance that the objectives are satisfied, that deficiencies are detected, evaluated,
tracked and resolved, and that the software product and software life cycle data conform to
certification requirements.
One of deficiencies found by the FCDM quality assurance manager was that tool qualification
of the unit test tool was insufficient. An audit of the supplier was deemed necessary and
subsequently performed.
7.3 Software configuration management process
The main activities of this process include configuration identification, change control, baseline
establishment and archiving of the software product, including the software life cycle data.
To manage the produced source code the NLR proprietary software repository tool is used.
During the coding process this tool enables the developers to develop several modules in
parallel and to update their development version with the latest committed version.
7.4 Certification liaison process
The objective of the certification process is to establish communication and mutual
understanding between the producer and the certification authority. For this it is important to
communicate the Plan for Software Aspect of Certification (PSAC) with the certification
authority as soon as possible. Changes required by the authority at a later stage (during
development) may be very difficult and expensive to implement.
8 Concluding remarks
The development of the safety critical avionics FCDM module as described above led to a
successful certification of the FCDS.
As usual there appeared to be a conflict between the proposed development life cycle and the
time to market as well as evolving system requirements. The major impact within the
development phase was that the Yourdon structured design method for the detailed design
appeared to be too heavy to maintain; the Yourdon structured design mehtod was replaced by
the far more pragmatic use of pseudo code and a simple call tree for each software component.
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The major impact for the verification was that the three test processes (validation, integration
and unit testing) had to be performed in parallel.
An early separation of software levels for the diverse software functions in the FCDM module is
very advantageous. Not only to ensure that more critical components are not affected by less
critical components, which is a safety requirement, but also in terms of reduction in the effort of
the software verification process.
The use of a coding standard is obvious for a safety critical application. However, since C isn’t
Ada additional guidelines are necessary to make it restrictive and by that safe. A (COTS) tool to
enforce the coding standard and the restrictive use of C relinquishes a lot of tedious code
walkthroughs.
The use of tables to implement the input/output processing, reconfigurations, calculations and
monitoring activities resulted in highly compact source code. This approach resulted in easily
maintainable code and corresponding test cases and procedures.
The tables were tested both manually (by inspection) and at the integration/validation level.
DO-178B is known to be a very mature and adequate guideline. The practical usage of DO-
178B in the FCDM project confirms this. It provides the flexibility required in commercial
applications development, while not compromising the safety requirements.
9 Abbreviations
AHRS Attitude Heading Reference System
CBIT Cyclic Built In Test
COTS Commercial Of The Shelf
CPU Central Processor Units
DPIFR Double Pilot Instrument Flight Rules
DPVFR Dual Visual Flight Rules
FCDM Flight Control Display Module
FCDS Flight Control and Display System
ICP Instrument Control Panels
ND Navigation Display unit
NVRAM Non Volatile RAM
PFD Primary Flight Display unit
POST Power-On Self-Test
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PROM Programmable Random Access Memory
PSAC Plan for Software Aspect of Certification
RAM Random Access Memory
RCU Reconfiguration Control Unit
RTC Real Time Clock
SA/RT Structured Analysis with Real Time extensions
SD Structured Design method
SPIFR Single Pilot Instrument Flight Rules
SPVFR Single Pilot Visual Flight Rules
WDT Watch Dog Timer
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